Asymptotically Optimal Tree-based Group Key Management Schemes by Sakai, Hideyuki & Yamamoto, Hirosuke
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
50
70
01
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
1 J
ul 
20
05
Asymptotically Optimal Tree-based Group Key
Management Schemes
Hideyuki Sakai
Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory
Asao-ku, Kawasaki-shi, Kanagawa 215–0013, Japan
Email: sakai@sdl.hitachi.co.jp
Hirosuke Yamamoto
School of Frontier Schiences, University of Tokyo
Kashiwa-shi, Chiba 277–8561, Japan
Email: Hirosuke@ieee.org
(Submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory)
Abstract
In key management schemes that realize secure multicast communications encrypted by group keys
on a public network, tree structures are often used to update the group keys efficiently. Selc¸uk and Sidhu
have proposed an efficient scheme which updates dynamically the tree structures based on the withdrawal
probabilities of members. In this paper, it is shown that Selc¸uk-Sidhu scheme is asymptotically optimal
for the cost of withdrawal. Furthermore, a new key management scheme, which takes account of key
update costs of joining in addition to withdrawal, is proposed. It is proved that the proposed scheme
is also asymptotically optimal, and it is shown by simulation that it can attain good performance for
nonasymptotic cases.
Index Terms
Multicast communication, Key management schemes, Logical key hierarchy scheme, Selc¸uk-Sidhu
scheme
I. INTRODUCTION
In the multicast communication of a group on a public network, a group secret key is often used
to realize secure communication. But, when a member joins and/or withdraws from the group, a new
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1group key must be redistributed.
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) scheme, which was independently proposed by Wallner-Harder-
Agee [1] and Wong-Gouda-Lam [2] in 1997, is a scheme with a tree structure that can renew the group
key securely and efficiently when a member changes. Poovendran and Baras [3] analyzed the LKH
scheme information-theoretically by considering the withdrawal probability of members in the scheme.
Furthermore, Selc¸uk and Sidhu [4] have proposed a more efficient scheme such that a tree structure is
dynamically updated based on the withdrawal probabilities of members. They analyzed the performance
of their scheme information-theoretically. But, their evaluation is very loose.
In this paper, we derive an asymptotically tight upper bound of the key update cost in Selc¸uk-Sidhu
scheme. More precisely, the key update cost is O(log n) when a group has n members, and our upper
bound is tight within a constant factor which does not depend on n. Furthermore, we propose a new
dynamical key management scheme, which takes account of key update costs for joining in addition to
withdrawal. We show that the proposed scheme is also asymptotically optimal. Moreover, it is shown by
simulation that in nonasymptotic cases, the proposed scheme is more efficient than Selc¸uk-Sidhu scheme
for joining while it is almost as efficient as Selc¸uk-Sidhu scheme for withdrawal.
In this paper, we assume that channels are noiseless and public. Hence, any information sent over
the channels may be wiretapped by adversaries who may be inside or outside of the group. Each member
has a private key and several subgroup keys in addition to a group key. The subgroup key and group key
are shared by the members of a subgroup and the group, respectively. The group key is used to encrypt
secret messages to communicate among the group. On the other hand, the private key and subgroup keys
are used when the keys must be updated by the change of members.
Furthermore, we suppose the following in this paper. A reliable server, who has all the keys in the
group, updates and distributes new keys when a member changes. The number of members in the group
is sufficiently large, and the frequency of joining and withdrawal is relatively large. The key update
cost is evaluated by the number of keys that must be updated when a member changes. To keep the
security of communication, the key management scheme needs to meet the so-called Forward Security
and Backward Security, which are defined as follows.
• [Forward Security] A member who withdraws from a group cannot decrypt any data that will be
sent in the group after the withdrawal.
• [Backward Security] A member who joins a group cannot decrypt the data that were sent in the
group before the joining.
In Section II, Selc¸uk-Sidhu scheme is reviewed, and the performance of the scheme is evaluated
precisely in Section III. Furthermore, in Section IV, Selc¸uk-Sidhu scheme is extended to consider the
cost of joining. Finally, some simulation results are shown in Section V.
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2II. SELC¸UK-SIDHU SCHEME
The LKH scheme [1], [2] can be represented by a binary tree such that each member of a group
corresponds to each leaf of the tree while the root, each internal node, and each leaf also correspond to
the group key, a subgroup key, and a private key, respectively. Each member holds all the keys on the
path from the root to the leaf of the member in the tree. Each internal node makes a subgroup which
consists of the descendants of the node, and the subgroup can communicate securely against any other
members not included in the subgroup by using the subgroup key. In the multicast communication of the
group, the group key is used to realize secure communication. But, when a member joins or withdraws
from the group, the subgroup keys and private keys are used to update the keys. Note that in order to
keep security, it is necessary to update all the keys on the path from the root to the leaf of the member.
For the LKH scheme, Poovendran and Baras [3] introduced the withdrawal probabilities of members
to analyze information-theoretically the average cost of key update in the case of the withdrawal. Let
G be a group and let PM be the probability that a member M ∈ G withdraws from the group within a
certain period1. PM is assumed to be given since it can be often estimated from the statistics and the
personal data of the member. PM satisfies 0 < PM ≤ 1. But, note that
PG ≡
∑
M∈G
PM , (1)
is usually not equal to one. Hence, we use the normalized withdrawal probability distribution P ≡
{PM/PG : M ∈ G} to evaluate the performance.
When a member withdraws from the group, the average withdrawal cost L and the average normalized
withdrawal cost l are defined by
L ≡
∑
M∈G
PMdM , (2)
l ≡
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
dM , (3)
respectively, where dM is the number of keys that must be updated when member M withdraws. We
note that dM is equal to the depth of member M in the key tree of the LKH scheme.
In the case of lossless source coding, l given by (3) corresponds to the average code length for a fixed-
to-variable length code (FV code) with probability distribution P and codeword length {dM : M ∈ G},
and it is well known that the Huffman tree [5] is the best tree to minimize the average code length under
the prefix condition. Furthermore, if the group is incremented and the probability distribution changes
as the coding progresses, the optimal code tree can be kept by the dynamic Huffman coding algorithm
[6][7].
1In order to keep the system securely, all keys are usually renewed periodically. Hence, the period is finite and PM < 1 for
many members.
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Fig. 1. Insertion of M by Insert(M,X).
In the case of key management, the prefix condition is also required because the set of keys of each
member must be different from that of others to keep security. Based on this observation, Poovendran
and Baras have shown that in the case of key management, the Huffman tree is the best tree to minimize
the average normalized withdrawal cost. However, if the key tree is updated by the dynamic Huffman
coding algorithm to keep the key tree optimally, the key update cost cannot be minimized usually because
the algorithm often changes the tree structure for many members besides a withdrawn member, and this
causes additional key update costs. Hence, in the case of key management, it is better to keep the tree
structure as unchanged as possible for non-withdrawn members. Based on this idea, Selc¸uk and Sidhu
[4] have proposed two key tree updating algorithms.
In order to explain Selc¸uk-Sidhu algorithms, we first define an operation Insert(M,X), which
represents the insertion of a new member M at node X , i.e. a new node N is inserted between X
and its parent node Y as shown in Fig. 1, and M is linked as a child of N .
For node X , let PX be the weight that is given by the sum of the withdrawal probabilities of all
members included in the descendants of node X .2 Then, the first algorithm to update a key tree is
described as follows.
Algorithm 1
Let M be a new member and let X be the root of a given key tree.
1. If X is a leaf, then operate Insert(M,X) and exit.
2. Let Xl and Xr be the left and right children of X , respectively. If it holds that PM ≥ PXl and
PM ≥ PXr , then operate Insert(M,X) and exit.
3. If PXl ≥ PXr , then let X ← Xr. Otherwise, let X ← Xl. Go back to Step 1.
2If X is the root, PX is equal to PG .
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4In order to describe the second algorithm, we first define the cost increase CM,X for a new member
M and a node X as follows [4].
CM,X ≡ (dX + 1)PM + PX , (4)
which represents the increase of cost L for the case that a new member M is inserted at node X .
Let Cmin be the minimum cost increase that is given by
Cmin ≡ min
X
CM,X . (5)
Then, the second algorithm inserts a new member M at the node that can attain Cmin. Formally, the
second algorithm to update a tree key is defined as follows.
Algorithm 2
Let M be a new member .
1) First calculate CM,X for every node X , and obtain Cmin. Let Xmin be the node that attains Cmin.
2) Operate Insert(M,Xmin).
It is shown by simulation in [4] that Algorithm 2 can attain less average withdrawal cost L than
Algorithm 1. But, although Algorithm 1 can be implemented with O(log n) time complexity when
|G| = n, i.e. the size of a group is n, Algorithm 2 requires O(n) time complexity in the search of Xmin.
Selc¸uk and Sidhu evaluated the average normalized withdrawal cost l for the case of Algorithm 1
as follows3 [4].
dM ≤ K1(− logPM + logPG) +K2, (6)
l ≤ K1H(P) +K2, (7)
where H(P) is the entropy of the probability distribution P = {PM/PG : M ∈ G}, and it is defined by
H(P) ≡ −
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
log
PM
PG
. (8)
K1 and K2 are constants given by
K1 ≡ 1
logα
≈ 1.44, (9)
K2 ≡ 1
logα
log
√
5
α
≈ 0.672, (10)
where α = 1+
√
5
2 .
We note from the source coding theorem for FV codes [8] that the average normalized withdrawal
cost l must satisfy
l ≥ H(P). (11)
3In this paper, the base of log is 2.
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5Furthermore, it holds from Theorem 1 shown below that H(P) = O(log n) for |G| = n. Hence, the
upper bound of l given by (7) is not asymptotically tight as n becomes large. This result means that
Algorithm 1 is not efficient or the upper bound is loose. In the next section, we will show that Algorithm
1 is asymptotically optimal by deriving an asymptotically tight upper bound.
Theorem 1 Assume that the maximum and minimum probabilities of withdrawal defined by
Pmax ≡ max
M∈G
PM ≤ 1, (12)
Pmin ≡ min
M∈G
PM > 0 (13)
are fixed. Then, for n = |G|, H(P) defined by (8) satisfies
H(P) = O(log n). (14)
Proof: Let ǫmin = Pmin/PG , ǫmax = Pmax/PG , and k = ǫmin/ǫmax = Pmin/Pmax. Then, H(P)
can be bounded as follows.
H(P) = −
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
log
PM
PG
(a)
≥ −
∑
M∈G
ǫmin log ǫmin
= nǫmin log
1
ǫmin
(b)
≥ ǫmin
ǫmax
logn
= k logn, (15)
where inequalities (a) and (b) hold because of the following reasons.
(a): −t log t is monotonically increasing when t > 0 is small. Furthermore, when n is sufficiently
large and PG ≫ 1, we have that ǫmin = PminPG ≤ 1PG ≪ 1.
(b): From the relation nPmax ≥ PG ≥ nPmin, it holds that
1
ǫmin
=
PG
Pmin
≥ n ≥ PG
Pmax
=
1
ǫmax
. (16)
Similarly, we can easily show that
H(P) ≤ 1
k
logn. (17)
Therefore, (14) is obtained from (15) and (17).
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6III. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SELC¸UK-SIDHU SCHEME
In order to derive a tight upper bound for the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1, we use the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let X and S be sibling nodes each other in the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1. Then,
it holds that
|PX − PS | ≤ Pmax, (18)
where Pmax is defined in (12).
Proof: The lemma can be proved by mathematical induction for the key tree with |G| = n. Let
P
(n)
X , P
(n)
S , and P
(n)
max be PX , PS , and Pmax in the case of |G| = n, respectively.
1. When n = 2, it holds that P (2)X ≤ P (2)S = P (2)max or P (2)S < P (2)X = P (2)max. In the former case, we
have 0 ≤ P (2)S − P (2)X < P (2)max. Otherwise, 0 < P (2)X − P (2)S < P (2)max. Hence, (18) holds.
2. Supposed that
|P (n)X − P (n)S | ≤ P (n)max (19)
holds for every pair of sibling nodes (X,S) in the key tree with |G| = n, and the key tree is
incremented to |G| = n + 1 by inserting a new member M with probability PM according to
Algorithm 1. Then, we have
P (n+1)max = max{P (n)max, PM} ≥ P (n)max. (20)
We assume, without loss of generality, that P (n)S ≥ P (n)X . Then, from Algorithm 1, there may occur
the following three cases.
Case 1: M is inserted outside nodes X , S, and their descendants.
In this case, it holds obviously that P (n+1)X = P
(n)
X and P
(n+1)
S = P
(n)
S . Hence, we obtain from
(19) and (20) that |P (n+1)X − P (n+1)S | ≤ P (n+1)max .
Case 2: M is inserted at node X as shown in Fig. 1.
In this case, we have the new pairs of sibling nodes, (X,M) and (N,S), where N was the
new parent node of X , and it holds from Step 2 of Algorithm 1 that [P (n)X ≤ PM < P (n)S or
PM < P
(n)
X ≤ P (n)S ] and [PM ≥ P (n)Xl , PM ≥ P
(n)
Xr
], where Xl and Xr are the children of X .
Hence, from P (n+1)X = P
(n)
X and P
(n+1)
S = P
(n)
S , we have that [P (n+1)X ≤ PM < P (n+1)S or
PM < P
(n+1)
X ≤ P (n+1)S ] and P (n+1)X ≤ 2PM .
In the case of P (n+1)X ≤ PM , it holds that 0 ≤ PM−P (n+1)X < P (n+1)S −P (n+1)X = P (n)S −P (n)X ≤
P
(n)
max ≤ P (n+1)max . Furthermore, in the case of P (n+1)X > PM , it holds that 0 < P (n+1)X − PM ≤
2PM − PM = PM ≤ P (n+1)max .
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7For the pair (N,S), we have that |P (n+1)S − P (n+1)N | = |P (n+1)S − P (n+1)X − PM | = |(P (n)S −
P
(n)
X )− PM | ≤ max{P (n)max, PM} = P (n+1)max .
Case 3: M is inserted at a descendant node of X .
In this case, we have that P (n+1)S = P
(n)
S and P
(n+1)
X = P
(n)
X + PM Hence, it holds that
|P (n+1)S − P (n+1)X | = |(P (n)S − P (n)X )− PM | ≤ max{P (n)max, PM} = P (n+1)max .
Now, we evaluate the weight of the ancestors of an arbitrarily given node X in the key tree generated
by Algorithm 1. Let nodes F and G be the parent and grandparent of X , respectively, and let U be the
sibling of F . Then, we have from Lemma 1 that
PF = PX + PS
≥ 2PX − Pmax. (21)
Furthermore, we have that
PG = PF + PU
≥ 2PF − Pmax
≥ 22PX − 2Pmax − Pmax, (22)
where the first and second inequalities holds from Lemma 1 and (21), respectively. By repeating the
same procedure, we obtain that
PG ≥ 2dXPX − (2dX−1 + 2dX−2 + · · ·+ 2 + 1)Pmax
= 2dX (PX − Pmax) + Pmax, (23)
where dX is the depth of node X .
Therefore, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2 In the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1, the following relation holds for any node X
and any leaf MX that is a descendant of X .
dX ≤ logPG + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
− log(PX − Pmax) (24)
d
(X)
M ≤ K1(− logPM + logPX) +K2, (25)
where d(X)M is the depth from node X to leaf M .
Proof: (24) and (25) hold from (23) and (6), respectively.
Next, we evaluate PX .
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8Lemma 2 Let Xl and Xr be the children of node X . Assume that the weight of X is larger than a real
number t but the weight of Xl is not larger than t, i.e. PX > t ≥ PXl . Then, the following inequalities
hold.
t < PX ≤ 2t+ Pmax (26)
Proof: From (18), we obtain that
PX = PXl + PXr ≤ 2PXl + Pmax ≤ 2t+ Pmax. (27)
Let t(> Pmax) be a parameter which will be optimized later. Now, for a given leaf M , we consider
the node X that is the nearest ancestor of M under the condition PX > t. Then, from (24), (25), and
(27), the depth dM of leaf M can be bounded as follows.
dM = dX + d
(X)
M
≤ logPG + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
− log(PX − Pmax) +K1(− logPM + logPX) +K2
< logPG + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
− log(t− Pmax)
+K1(− logPM + log(2t+ Pmax)) +K2 (28)
We can easily show for f(t) = − log(t − Pmax) +K1 log(2t+ Pmax) that f(t) can be minimized
at t = tm given by
tm =
2 + logα
2(1− logα) ≈ 4.405, (29)
where α = 1+
√
5
2 . Note that if a key tree is sufficient large and efficiently constructed, there exists the
node X that satisfies PX > tm > Pmax. Hence, by substituting t = tm into (28) and some calculations,
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When the key tree constructed by Algorithm 1 is sufficiently large, the depth dM of a leaf
M in the key tree is upper bounded as follows.
dM < logPG −K1 logPM + (K1 − 1) logPmax + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3, (30)
where K3 is defined by
K3 = − log 3 logα
2(1− logα) +
1
logα
(
log
3
1− logα + log
√
5
α
)
≈ 3.65. (31)
By averaging dM for all member in G, the following theorem holds for the average normalized
withdrawal cost l.
August 8, 2018 DRAFT
9Theorem 4 When a key tree constructed by Algorithm 1 is sufficiently large, the average normalized
withdrawal cost l of the key tree satisfies that
l < H(P) + (K1 − 1) log Pmax
Pmin
+ log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3. (32)
Proof: l can be evaluated as follows.
l =
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
dM
< logPG −K1
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
logPM + (K1 − 1) logPmax + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3
= logPG −K1
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
log
PM
PG
−K1
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
logPG
+(K1 − 1) logPmax + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3
(a)
= logPG +K1H(P)−K1 logPG + (K1 − 1) logPmax + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3
= K1H(P)− (K1 − 1) logPG + (K1 − 1) logPmax + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3
(b)
≤ K1H(P) + (K1 − 1)
(
log
1
Pmin
−H(P)
)
+ (K1 − 1) logPmax + log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3
= H(P) + (K1 − 1) log Pmax
Pmin
+ log
(
1− Pmax
PG
)
+K3, (33)
where equality (a) and inequality (b) hold from (8) and the following lemma, respectively.
Lemma 3 H(P), PG , and Pmin satisfy that
− logPG ≤ log 1
Pmin
−H(P). (34)
Proof: It is well known that the entropy H(P) is bounded by logn for |G| = n, and it holds
obviously that PG ≥ nPmin. Hence, we obtain that
H(P)− logPG ≤ logn− log (nPmin) = log 1
Pmin
. (35)
We finaly note that in (32), the coefficient of H(P) = O(log n) is one and the second and third
terms are constants. Hence, Theorem 4 gives an asymptotically tight bound of l.
IV. EXTENSION OF SELC¸UK-SIDHU SCHEME
In Selc¸uk-Sidhu scheme [4], only the withdrawal cost of a new member is considered. But, the
withdrawal cost is an expected cost in the future, which may not be occur. On the other hand, it is
always necessary to update a key tree when a new member joins. Hence, in this section, we propose
extended schemes of Algorithms 1 and 2 to consider the joining cost in addition to the withdrawal cost.
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When a new member is inserted at the node X with depth dX , the withdrawal cost L increases by
CM,X , which is given by (4). But, at the same time, dX + 1 keys in the tree must be updated with
probability one for the joining. Hence, the cost increase including the joining cost, say C∗M,X , can be
given by
C∗M,X ≡ (dX + 1)PM + PX + 1 · (dX + 1) (36)
= (dX + 1)(PM + 1) + PX . (37)
Comparing C∗M,X with CM,X , we note that PM in CM,X is changed to PM + 1 in C∗M,X . Hence,
by substituting PM + 1 into PM in Algorithms 1 and 2, we can obtain the following algorithms which
consider the joining cost.
Algorithm 3
Let M be a new member and let X be the root of a given key tree.
1) If X is a leaf, then operate Insert(M,X) and exit.
2) Let Xl and Xr be the left and right children of X , respectively. If it holds that PM + 1 ≥ PXl
and PM + 1 ≥ PXr , then operate Insert(M,X) and exit.
3) If PXl ≥ PXr , then let X ← Xr. Otherwise, let X ← Xl. Go back to Step 1.
Algorithm 4
Let M be a new member .
1) First calculate C∗M,X for every node X , and obtain C∗min, where C∗min ≡ min
X
C∗M,X . Let X∗min be
the node that attains C∗min.
2) Operate Insert(M,X∗min).
For Algorithm 3, the following theorem holds in the same way as Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 When the key tree constructed by Algorithm 3 is sufficiently large, the average normalized
withdrawal cost l of the key tree satisfies that
l < H(P) + logPmax + (K1 − 1) log(3Pmax + 5)
−K1 logPmin + Pmax + 4
Pmin
+ log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
+K4, (38)
where K4 is defined as follows.
K4 = −
(
1
logα
− 1
)
log
(
1
logα
− 1
)
+
1
logα
log
2
√
5e
α log e
(39)
≈ 3.95 (40)
Proof: (The proof is given in the appendix.)
We note from Theorem 5 that the coefficient of H(P) in (38) is also one although the constant terms
are larger than (32). This means that Algorithm 3 can also attain asymptotically optimal key tree for the
withdrawal cost in addition to decreasing the joining cost.
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TABLE I
AVERAGE CASES FOR JOINING
n 100 10, 000
m 100 10, 000 100 10, 000
Alg. 1 7.42 7.32 13.19 14.14
Alg. 2 7.53 7.35 14.23 14.20
Alg. 3 6.50 6.23 12.85 13.12
Alg. 4 6.51 6.26 13.02 13.14
TABLE II
AVERAGE CASES FOR WITHDRAWAL
n 100 10, 000
m 100 10, 000 100 10, 000
Alg. 1 5.46 5.51 12.11 12.19
Alg. 2 5.39 5.45 12.03 12.14
Alg. 3 5.75 5.76 12.26 12.33
Alg. 4 5.57 5.71 12.13 12.28
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the previous sections, we showed that Algorithms 1 and 3 are asymptotically optimal and
Algorithms 2 and 4 are expected to achieve more efficient performance than Algorithms 1 and 3,
respectively, in the case of withdrawal. In this section, we evaluate the performances of Algorithms
1–4 by simulation.
We first construct the optimal tree, i.e., Huffman tree for a group with n members. Then, a new
member joins the group each after a member withdraws from the group. Such joining and withdrawal
are repeated m times. It is assumed that the withdrawal probability of a new member PM is uniformly
distributed in [0.1, 0.9]. For this case, the average costs of joining and withdrawal are shown in Tables I
and II, respectively.
We note from the tables that Algorithms 3 and 4 can improve the cost of joining at a little increased
cost of withdrawal. Algorithms 2 and 4 are more efficient than Algorithms 1 and 3, respectively, in the
case of withdrawal. But the difference is not large, and Algorithms 2 and 4 require O(n) time complexity
although Algorithms 1 and 3 can be implemented with O(log n) time complexity. Therefore, Algorithms
3 and 4 should be used in the cases of large n and small n, respectively.
If the backward security described in section I is not required for a group, we don’t need change any
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group and subgroup keys when a new member joins the group. Hence, it is preferable to use Algorithms
1 or 2 in such a case.
APPENDIX
A. The proof of Theorem 5
For the key tree constructed by Algorithm 3, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4 Let X and S be sibling nodes each other in the key tree constructed by Algorithm 3. Then,
it holds that
|PX − PS | ≤ Pmax + 2, (41)
where Pmax is defined in (12).
Proof: The lemma can be proved in the same way as Lemma 1.
Now, for a give leaf M , let nodes X and Y be ancestors of M such that Y is an ancestor of X ,
PX > 1, and PY > Pmax + 2. When |G| = n is sufficiently large, there always exist such nodes X and
Y . We represent the depths from the root to node Y , from node Y to node X , and from node X to leaf
M by dY , d(Y )X , d
(X)
M , respectively, which satisfy that
dM = dY + d
(Y )
X + d
(X)
M . (42)
Then, by using Lemma 4, we can prove in the same way as (24) and (25) that
dY ≤ logPG + log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
− log(PY − Pmax − 2), (43)
d
(Y )
X ≤ K1[− log(PX − 1) + log(PY − 1)] +K2. (44)
Furthermore, d(X)M obviously satisfies that
d
(X)
M ≤
PX
Pmin
− 1. (45)
Let real numbers t > Pmax + 2 and s > 1 be parameters which will be optimized later. For given
(t, s), we select nodes X and Y such that X is the nearest ancestor of M under the condition PX > s
and Y is the nearest ancestor of X under the condition PY > t. Then, in the same way as (26), we can
show that
s < PX ≤ 2s+ Pmax + 2, (46)
t < PY ≤ 2t+ Pmax + 2. (47)
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By combining (42)–(47), we obtain the following bound of dM .
dM ≤ logPG + log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
− log(PY − Pmax − 2)
+K1[− log(PX − 1) + log(PY − 1)] +K2 + PX
Pmin
− 1
< logPG + log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
− log(t− Pmax − 2)
+K1[− log(s− 1) + log(2t+ Pmax + 1)] +K2 + 2s+ Pmax + 2
Pmin
− 1 (48)
Letting
g(t) = − log(t− Pmax − 2) +K1 log(2t+ Pmax + 1), (49)
h(s) = −K1 log(s− 1) + 2s
Pmin
, (50)
we can easily show that g(t) and h(s) are minimized at t = t˜m and s = s˜m, respectively, which are
given by
t˜m =
(2 + logα)Pmax + 4 + logα
2(1− logα)
≈ tmPmax + 7.676, (51)
s˜m =
log e
2 logα
Pmin + 1
≈ 1.040Pmin + 1, (52)
where tm ≈ 4.405 is defined in (29). By substituting t = t˜m and s = s˜m into (48), we can obtain after
some calculations that
dM < logPG + (K1 − 1) log(3Pmax + 5)−K1 logPmin
+
Pmax + 4
Pmin
+ log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
+K4, (53)
where K4 is defined in (39).
Since the average normalized withdrawal cost l is the average of dM , l is bounded as follows.
l =
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
dM
< logPG + (K1 − 1) log(3Pmax + 5)−K1 logPmin + Pmax + 4
Pmin
+ log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
+K4
≤ H(P) + logPmax + (K1 − 1) log(3Pmax + 5)−K1 logPmin
+
Pmax + 4
Pmin
+ log
(
1− Pmax + 2
PG
)
+K4, (54)
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where the last inequality holds because we have from (8) that
logPG = H(P) +
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
logPM
≤ H(P) +
∑
M∈G
PM
PG
logPmax
= H(P) + logPmax. (55)
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